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Summary The South Caucasus continues to be critically important to Eurasian 
security. The outbreak of fighting in April 2016 between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh introduced new uncertainty 
and confrontation to the region. Russia’s policies here are crucial, as they are in 
the region’s other ethno-political conflicts, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Sergey 
Markedonov offers an insider’s perspective on the Kremlin’s involvement in the 
region, highlighting its security concerns and stressing that Russia is not taking 
a universal approach to all of the post-Soviet conflict zones. While the “Western” 
political and expert community often assumes that territorial revisionism is a kind of 
idée fixe within Russia, this is far from the case. Each situation demands an indi-
vidual response from Moscow, as it weighs and pursues its own interests.  
This in turn explains the improbability of “Crimean situations” multiplying in the  
South Caucasus. The region undoubtedly harbors risks of confrontation – not only 
between Russia and the countries of the immediate region but also with such large 
powers as the US, the EU, Turkey, and Iran – but it also holds several opportunities 
for cooperation.
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Introduction
The tenuous political situation in the South Caucasus has 
been pushed off the news agenda by the crises in Syria 
and eastern Ukraine. But despite the shift of attention 
of diplomats, this region is still of strategic importance. 
As American scholar Daniel Treisman noted of the fast 
evolving crisis in Ukraine, by “annexing a neighboring 
country’s territory by force, [Russian President Vladimir] 
Putin overturned in a single stroke the assumptions on 
which the post-Cold-War European order had rested.”1 
Many are now asking whether the Kremlin is open to 
taking a similar approach in the South Caucasus, a region 
full of ethno-political conflicts and contradictions. 
The renewal of fighting in early April 2016 between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh 
ushered in a new period of uncertainty and confronta-
tion for the South Caucasus. A challenge to the status quo 
was not completely unexpected. There had been more 
frequent violent incidents along the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Line of Contact as well as at the internationally recog-
nized Armenia-Azerbaijan border, but April saw the worst 
 fighting since the cease-fire of May 12, 1994. 
The violence we saw in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016 may 
recur at any time. The conflict zone has no peacekeepers 
and only a small number of OSCE observers, and the 1994 
cease-fire has lasted thus far thanks only to a tenuous 
balance of forces, which may change in the future.2 Both 
the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments still insist 
that their maximum demands for resolving the conflict 
be met, while the three OSCE Minsk Group (OSCE MG) 
co-chairs mediating the conflict – France, Russia, and the 
United States – lack instruments to coerce the parties into 
making concessions.3
A Turbulent Region 
The Caucasus is home to six of the nine armed conflicts 
currently found in the post-Soviet region, and none of 
them can be considered “settled.” To be sure, there are dif-
ferent interpretations of what the settlement of an ethno-
political conflict consists of. For example, Russia considers 
the recognition of the independence from Georgia of the 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be 
a solution to the conflict, whereas Georgia considers it 
occupation by Russia, an interpretation that the US and 
some EU member states (Lithuania, Romania) also support. 
Other EU and NATO members insist on Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, considering the two regions to be part of Georgia. 
Regarding the standoff between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia considers the self-deter-
mination of the Armenian community there to be the only 
way of resolving the standoff with Azerbaijan, while the 
latter assumes that the only solution consists of reintegrat-
ing the breakaway area into its territory.4
Several general points should be kept in mind. First, 
the situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are rela-
tively quiet compared to Nagorno-Karabakh. These two 
partly recognized republics currently enjoy Russia’s 
political-military guarantees and military support as well 
as its socioeconomic assistance. Georgia, despite official 
rhetoric stating that restoring its territorial integrity is 
its utmost priority, is making no effort to establish its 
jurisdiction over the cities of Sukhumi (Abkhazia) and 
Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), which serve as the capitals of 
the respective breakaway republics. Certainly, the Abkha-
zian and South Ossetian decisions to assert independence 
from Georgia – undertaken with Moscow’s full support 
– have had the effect of strengthening Georgia’s ties with 
the US, NATO, and the EU. Georgia’s current government, 
led by the political party Georgian Dream, has not called 
into question the pro-Western vector pursued during 
Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency (2004–13). Indeed, it has 
developed it further. At the same time, actions taken in 
South Ossetia with Moscow’s support to delimit the bor-
der (the process is also known as “borderization”) cause 
suspicions in Georgia and the West that Russia is advanc-
ing into Georgian territory proper.
Second, although the South Caucasus has less impor-
tance for US interests than for Russian, Russia and the US 
both still consider it to be an area of geopolitical competi-
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tion. Events in Ukraine have perhaps obscured this, but 
competition has not faded away entirely. For Washington, 
this region is interesting in the context of “energy plural-
ism” as an alternative supplier of gas and oil to Europe. 
It is also a potential source of leverage for containing 
Iranian and Russian ambitions. For the Russian Federa-
tion, which includes the seven republics of the troubled 
North Caucasus, the developments across the Caucasus 
mountain range as a continuation of its domestic politi-
cal agenda. This is particularly the case in the security 
sphere but also relates to Russia’s more general geopoliti-
cal ambitions to control post-Soviet states by maintaining 
Russian influence, which is currently assured through 
energy dependence, and by preventing them from inte-
grating with Western and other institutions.
Third, the region is also influenced by the threat com-
ing from the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). Middle East-
ern jihadist structures such as Al Qaeda had never before 
declared the Caucasus to be a sphere of their interests or 
a priority region, but in the summer of 2014, ISIS repre-
sentatives stated that a significant number of its leaders 
are of Caucasian origin.5 The North Caucasian republics 
of the Russian Federation, in particular, are an important 
source of Islamic fighters in the Middle East.
Eurasian Integration versus  
European Integration
Certainly, the Ukrainian crisis has heightened the general 
competition between European and Eurasian integration 
projects for post-Soviet states. Moldova, Georgia, and 
Ukraine chose to sign Association Agreements (including 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements) with 
the European Union. Others – Armenia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan – joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU). Finally, some of these states (for example, 
Azerbaijan) decided to balance between the EU and EAEU 
integration projects. At the same time Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine are caught up in ethnic and politi-
cal conflicts and consider the possibilities of integrating 
either with Russia or the EU to be one tool among others.
Where Georgia is concerned, the crisis in Ukraine has 
led to the intensification of contacts between Georgia 
and NATO. Although the government has not obtained a 
NATO Membership Action Plan, and although a member-
ship perspective for the country is highly unlikely, NATO 
has already granted it a package of “enhanced coopera-
tion.” In August 2015, a joint training center was opened 
in Krtsanisi, near Tbilisi, to train Georgian officers and 
the military of both NATO members and partner states.
Armenia’s Eurasian integration, though more aligned 
with Russian interests, also faces some problems against 
the current background of socioeconomic crisis, Western 
sanctions against Russia, and the suboptimal (if not to 
say inadequate) management of large Russian companies 
operating in the republic.6 Inside Armenia, moreover, 
the authorities’ stake in pursuing the Eurasian vector is 
viewed quite ambiguously. The opposition to President 
Serzh Sargsyan (and the bureaucratic “Fronde” within 
governmental structures) insists that he sacrificed the 
principle of complementarity in foreign policy under Rus-
sian pressureand  questions Russia’s security support for 
Armenia.7
The two partly recognized republics of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are decidedly less ambiguous in their 
positions on integration with Russia. When Georgia 
solidified its pro-Western stance, the appetite within 
the two state entities grew considerably for increasing 
cooperation with Russia and, in fact, handing over to 
Russia the functions of security, border protection, and 
defense. In Abkhazia, however, this has been accompa-
nied by concerns about the loss of its own sovereignty. 
South Ossetia, on the other hand, is displeased with 
the unwillingness of Russian authorities to repeat the 
actions undertaken in Crimea, which would allow the 
breakaway republic to unite with North Ossetia within 
the Russian Federation.8
As far as other regional stakeholders are concerned, 
it is important to remember that the South Caucasus 
region is also of enormous importance in relations in-
volving the West, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. The Iranian 
government remains extremely sensitive about the 
influence of non-regional actors in the neighborhood. It 
has long considered the affairs of the Caucasus to be the 
legitimate domain of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, 
together with the three primary regional stakeholders 
Iran, Turkey, and Russia. This deeply felt position helps 
explain the Iranian position on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Iran has developed a number of proposals that 
might be considered an alternative to the Updated Ma-
drid Principles on Karabakh. (Though these have not yet 
been published, Tehran considers them an integral part 
of its foreign policy discourse.) Certainly, Iran is not in-
terested in seeing a conflict settlement involve the place-
ment of international peacekeeping forces in the region, 
no matter the flag under which might be deployed.
Although Turkey considers the Middle East to be 
its top priority region, there are several fundamental 
factors behind its interest in the Caucasus. It has strong 
ties with Azerbaijan as well as Georgia, being involved 
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in various energy, infrastructure, security, and military 
projects in both countries. Armenia is the most challeng-
ing issue for Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet 
sphere.9
The Special Significance of Russian Policy
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
identified the South Caucasus as an area of crucial 
importance for its core strategic interests. Many Western 
experts, however, are perplexed by its persistent efforts to 
preserve its domination over this part of the post-Soviet 
neighborhood. It is not just because it is the successor 
to the USSR, however, that the Russian Federation has 
claimed a special role in the geopolitics of the Caucasus.
Unlike the USSR, present-day Russia does not pretend 
to play a global political role. Rather, its ambitions and in-
fluence in the international arena depend on and are lim-
ited by its status as a nuclear power and as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. Russia, alongside 
China, is in a long-running dispute with the West over the 
latter’s position on intervening in domestic political pro-
cesses in times of conflict. This was demonstrated in the 
period of NATO intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo as well 
as the US intervention in Iraq. Russia generally considers 
this damaging to state sovereignty. (In practice, it has not 
always been consistent on this point. Examples are the 
August War with Georgia of 2008, its recognition of both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the annexation of – or 
reunification with – the Crimean Peninsula.)
Stepping back from this larger debate, the Russian ap-
proach is to treat its “near abroad” as territory crucial to 
its own interests.10 By this token, Russian leaders consider 
any activities in this part of the world by external actors 
like NATO or the EU as a challenge to its dominant role. 
While the Kremlin has not issued any relevant official 
policy formulations for the South Caucasus (or, for that 
matter, for its own constituencies in the North Caucasus), 
Russia’s policy clearly reflects its desire to assert regional 
leadership. To this end, it has demonstrated its readiness 
to adjust borders (in the cases of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), to prevent outside penetration in the region (in 
the case of its opposition to NATO, the US, and the EU), 
and to maintain a central role in managing the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.
In this way, the Kremlin follows a policy of “selective 
revisionism.” While it has recognized the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it has chosen not to 
recognize the Armenian-run Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 
(NKR) and even blames any electoral campaigns held 
there on the de facto authorities in NKR. Russia actively 
cooperates with the West within the framework of the 
OSCE MG, as this strengthens its position as a regional 
leader. Unlike Georgia, Russia and the US have found 
more common ground on this issue. Moreover, Russia’s 
mediating role undertaken in the context of the OSCE MG 
is strongly backed by France (representing the EU) and 
the US. Although Armenia remains a strategic partner 
of Russia due to its CSTO and Eurasian Union member-
ship, Russia is also interested in pursuing a constructive 
relationship with Azerbaijan. So, too, is it interested in 
normalizing its bilateral relationship with Georgia, while 
remaining careful about not crossing “red lines” – such 
as broaching the status of the two breakaway republics. 
While Russian authorities changed the status of Crimea 
through annexation, they have shown no interest in bring-
ing Abkhazia and South Ossetia under its jurisdiction, 
despite numerous requests from the South Ossetian side.
It should be stressed that the Kremlin’s geopolitical 
ambitions in the South Caucasus are not intended to 
produce some sort of imperial resurgence.11 Rather, the 
Kremlin considers ensuring stability in the former Soviet 
republics there to be a prerequisite for its own peaceful 
domestic development and for the preservation of its 
territorial integrity. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
Russia is a Caucasian state. Seven of its constituencies 
– Adygeya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia and Chechnya – are 
immediately situated in the North Caucasus, a territory 
larger than the three South Caucasus independent states 
combined. Four more Russian federal subjects – the terri-
tories of Krasnodar and Stavropol, the Rostov region, and 
Kalmykia – are located in the steppe foothills of the Cau-
casus. The Caucasus region includes the Black Sea shore 
of the Krasnodar territory and the popular group of spa 
resorts in the Stavropol territory known as the Caucasian 
Mineral Waters. 
The ethno-political tensions that have arisen in these 
regions of Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus, 
are closely connected with conflicts underway in the 
South Caucasus. The dynamics of the Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict, for example, have had a serious impact on the 
Ossetian-Ingush conflict in North Ossetia, while the 
Georgian-Abkhaz situation has influenced developments 
within Russia’s Circassian population. The security en-
vironment in Chechnya and Dagestan has also been con-
nected with developments in the Pankisi Gorge (Georgia’s 
Akhmet region). Russia and Azerbaijan face the issue of 
ethnic groups divided by the common border (the Lezgins 
and Avars). It is in Russia’s interest to have a positive 
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relationship with Azerbaijan regardless of its strategic 
military partnership with Armenia. Ensuring stability in 
the Russian Caucasus is thus inseparable from achieving 
stability in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
During the whole post-Soviet period, Russia has not 
however developed a comprehensive model for the South 
Caucasus region, instead limiting itself to serving in a 
stabilizing capacity. Such a role could be justified in the 
“hotspots,” but by concentrating solely on “freezing” these 
conflicts, it has failed to address persistent socioeconomic 
and socio-cultural issues, including the need for mod-
ernization. It is worth noting, moreover, that it has taken 
practically the same approach in its domestic policy to-
ward the North Caucasus. Here, too, stability has a higher 
priority than modernization.
Russia and Georgia: Viewing Strategic  
Differences against the Background  
of Tactical Shifts
The Georgian parliamentary and presidential elections of 
October 2012 and October 2013, respectively, significantly 
changed the country’s internal political landscape and 
brought Mikheil Saakashvili’s ten-year presidency to an 
end. Under Saakashvili’s tenure, Russian-Georgian rela-
tions had reached their lowest point since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Georgia broke diplomatic relations with 
Russia, and the two countries lived through a five-day 
open military conflict in August 2008. Russia’s recogni-
tion that month of the independence of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia created a precedent – the first since 1991– 
for revising borders between two former Soviet republics.
When President Saakashvili and his United National 
Movement left power, some changes occurred in the 
Russian-Georgian relationship, but these were tactical 
and selective, and still are. The new Georgian authorities, 
representing the Georgian Dream party, have maintained 
their predecessor’s strategic approaches of continuing 
and strengthening integration with NATO and the EU. 
The new leaders initialed the Association Agreement 
with the EU in November 2013 and then ratified it in the 
summer of 2014. It also extended the participation of the 
Georgian military in NATO operations in Afghanistan 
and expressed its readiness to take part in an operation in 
Central Africa under the aegis of the EU. These decisions 
were made even in the absence of progress on the liberal-
ization of EU visas for Georgian citizens. 
Georgia’s new leaders made some serious departures 
from the Saakashvili administration’s tactics, however. 
They saw a better way of meeting their strategic goals – 
membership in NATO and the EU – not through a head-on 
confrontation with Russia but through a pragmatic ap-
proach to relations. This policy resulted in: 
 . a halt to the rhetoric of confrontation and the use of 
Russia as a factor for domestic political mobilization; 
 . a refusal to support nationalist movements in the North 
Caucasus, to engage in political alliances with them, 
or to position Georgia as a “Caucasian alternative” to 
Russia; 
 . a declaration of readiness to cooperate on security dur-
ing the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics; 
 . the establishment of direct dialog between Georgian 
and Russian representatives (excluding the discus-
sion of status debates on Abkhazia and South Ossetia) 
within the format of meetings between Russian Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin and Zurab 
Abashidze, the Georgian prime minister’s special repre-
sentative for relations with Russia; 
 . and an opening of the Georgian economy to Russian 
investments. 
Russia for its part opened a market for Georgian goods 
(alcohol, mineral water, citrus fruits) and eased the visa 
regime for Georgian carriers (drivers).
Despite public support in Georgia for the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine and condemnation of Russia’s an-
nexation of Crimea, Georgia’s leaders have refused to “tie” 
Georgian policy to the Ukrainian crisis.
The agenda of normalizing Russian-Georgian rela-
tions has exhausted itself, however, when confronted 
with the two major “red lines”: the status of the two 
partly recognized republics and the two countries’ dif-
ferent approaches to the engagement of NATO and the 
EU in Caucasian affairs. In fact, the only current issue 
of possible cooperation between the two states remains 
anti-terrorist activity, particularly considering the 
increasing radicalization of the population in Georgia’s 
Akhmet region (Pankisi Gorge), which borders the Rus-
sian Federation, and the participation of many people 
from this area in Islamist movements in the Middle East 
– above all, in ISIS.12
Nagorno-Karabakh: Menacing Escalation
In the past two years, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has 
intensified seriously. Incidents have been registered both 
along the belligerent parties’ Line of Contact as well as 
on the internationally recognized Armenian-Azerbaijani 
border outside Karabakh – in areas that the official docu-
ments of the peace process (the Updated Madrid Prin-
ciples) do not consider part of the ethno-political conflict. 
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Together, these incidents have been the most numerous 
since the truce was established in 1994.
The escalation brings with it several major threats. 
The first is that military actions will resume, including 
possible foreign engagement in the conflict. (Here the 
strategic nature of the military and political partnership 
between Azerbaijan and Turkey must be taken into ac-
count.) Second, although the Azerbaijani military’s attack 
on the infrastructure of the unrecognized Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic may formally be considered an action 
by a sovereign state against separatists, the spillover of 
hostilities into Armenian territory would force an activa-
tion of the mechanisms of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO), of which Armenia and Russia are 
both members. Such a decision is unlikely to find unani-
mous support within the CSTO, however. Stable coopera-
tion exists between Azerbaijan and the CSTO members 
Kazakhstan and Belarus, and the presidents of both 
countries have taken special positions on Eurasian inte-
gration.13 Furthermore, it could have a negative impact on 
the dynamic of Eurasian integration, which potentially 
might pose an additional risk for Russian foreign policy.
The outbreak of violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and on 
the Armenian-Azerbaijani border largely became possible 
due to heightened confrontation between Russia and the 
Western states. Unlike in the “Georgian” conflicts, West-
ern states have worked for many years for a settlement of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It could be argued that 
the belligerent parties are testing the readiness of the 
three OSCE MG co-chairs France, Russia, and the US to re-
act jointly to armed incidents, maintain a unified approach 
to negotiations, and ensure the peace process as a whole.
Since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, it appears 
increasingly likely that each member of the OSCE MG 
intends to pursue peacemaking in Nagorno-Karabakh 
independently. The US diplomat James Warlick’s state-
ment of May 2014 referring to “settlement elements” 
was presented as a US government plan rather than a 
coordinated line on the part of all three mediators. So 
were the concurrent debates in the US Congress on the 
Act on Prevention of Russian Aggression (which also 
covered Azerbaijan). In September 2014, the leaders of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan held talks with the US Secretary 
of State John Kerry on the margins of the NATO sum-
mit in Newport, Wales. For its part, Russia had initiated 
a three-party meeting of the Russian, Armenian, and 
Azerbaijani presidents in Sochi in August 2014; while 
France  organized another meeting that November. To 
date, however, the Russian government has not princi-
pally changed its previous approaches to the settlement of 
the conflict (the status of NKR, the role of the OSCE MG, 
and Russia’s participation in it). It has only made a minor 
correction:  offering a three-party meeting with the par-
ticipation of the Russian president as an additional format 
for negotiations – an action that does not directly call the 
institutional framework of the OSCE MG into question. 
Certainly, the problem remains very topical of how the 
three co-chair states will cooperate if incidents similar to 
those of April 2016 are repeated. 
The Gains and Costs of Armenia’s  
Eurasian Integration
In January 2015, Armenia officially joined the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU). While Armenia is traditionally 
considered Russia’s key political and military ally in the 
region, this understanding reflects only the external con-
tours of the complex dynamics of the choices now being 
made in the South Caucasus between the Euro-Atlantic 
and Eurasian integration. There are in fact substantial 
nuances involved.
Up to September 2013, Armenia’s leaders could not de-
cide which integration vector to choose. Some high-rank-
ing officials voiced skepticism about the Customs Union 
and Eurasian integration, in particular former Prime Min-
ister Tigran Sargsyan, who resigned in early April 2015, 
and such diplomats as Shavarsh Kocharyan, the deputy 
minister of foreign affairs. These pointed to a number of 
concerns, including the absence of common border with 
Russia, dependence on the “Georgian window” (through 
which two thirds of Armenian exports and imports have 
been moving) for access to the outside world, and the 
need to diversify its foreign policy to prevent Azerbaijan 
from unilaterally strengthening its positions in the West.14 
Some “technical problems” are still topical and are 
indeed very important for Armenia’s domestic policy. The 
issue of customs tariffs is one example, to say nothing of 
the fear of losses incurred by Western sanctions against 
Russia, although their impact is in fact quite marginal. 
Opponents of President Serzh Sargsyan’s current admin-
istration, including the Civil Contract party, the Free 
Democrats, and the national liberal party Heritage, have 
also extended their criticism to the Kremlin for support-
ing him. Doubts about Russia as a reliable and equal 
partner are extremely important when seen against 
the background of the constitutional reforms that were 
passed in 2015, which have been controversial both in 
political circles and in Armenian society at large.
Armenia’s choice for Eurasian integration was also ac-
companied by skepticism on the part of some of Russia’s 
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other strategic partners. Although Kazakhstan’s President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev has since withdrawn concerns he 
voiced about Armenia’s EAEU membership, one cannot 
rule out the continuation of latent discontent. If the  
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalates in any way, or if 
hostilities resume between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
 Kazakhstan’s position will surely be articulated precisely.
Azerbaijan: Partnership without  
Overrated Expectations
Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan suffered a 
decline after the countries failed to agree on prolonging 
Russia’s lease on the Gabala Radar Station in 2012. Since 
2013, however, they have begun to improve again. 
Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan does not seek NATO 
membership. It has been a member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement since 2011. As a Muslim country, Azerbaijan is 
extremely watchful of the Western policy of supporting 
the democratization of the “broader Middle East” (and 
above all, of the West’s engagement with, or possible 
confrontation with, neighboring Iran). As a consequence, 
the country’s leaders are interested in maintaining 
 cooperation with Russia. 
Azerbaijan highly values the trans-border cooperation 
with Russia in the fight against terrorism. (The two states 
share a common border at the Dagestani area.) Azer-
baijan and Russia also take common approaches to the 
Caspian Sea. They have developed a very active military-
technical cooperation.15 Azerbaijan’s intensive purchases 
of Russian arms are, moreover, compensating Moscow for 
the pro-Western elements of Azerbaijani energy policy. 
They also demonstrate that Russia is not a potential 
adversary of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
despite Russian security guarantees for the territory of 
Armenia proper, both at the bilateral Russian-Armenian 
level and within the CSTO framework. It should be noted 
that this arms trade created displeasure in Armenian 
political circles and public opinion. If violence in  
Nagorno-Karabakh escalates, the topic will certainly be 
very relevant for Russian-Armenian relations. 
Russia, unlike the Western states, does not criticize 
Azerbaijani domestic political standards. It is especially 
supportive of Azerbaijani parliamentary and presidential 
elections. This is an important factor legitimizing Azer-
baijan’s political reality on an international level, which 
the government in Baku highly appreciates.
Despite this, the Russian-Azerbaijani partnership also 
has limitations. First, Azerbaijan seeks to play its own 
role in regional energy projects, presenting itself as a 
partner of the West. Second, its government firmly and 
 consistently supports the territorial integrity of both 
Georgia and Ukraine. (On March 27, 2014, Azerbaijan 
voted at the UN General Assembly for the resolution 
supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and calling 
the referendum in Crimea invalid.16) Third, it has no 
intention of joining Eurasian integration projects un-
der Russian patronage because it considers that Russia 
does not do enough to promote the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For its part, Moscow itself 
tries to implement a new, more effective form of regional 
integration that would not resemble the Commonwealth 
of Independent States based predominantly on a shared 
USSR background. 
Unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled, the 
joint presence of Armenia and Azerbaijan in a single inte-
gration structure – the CIS – would reduce that structure’s 
efficiency to zero. 
The Partly Recognized Republics:  
Strengthening Russian Influence and Recog-
nizing the Factors of Hidden Dissatisfaction
Georgia’s stronger pro-Western foreign policy vector has 
led to political radicalization in Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia. The United Ossetia Party, which consistently supports 
the breakaway republic’s unification with North Ossetia 
within the Russian Federation, won parliamentary elec-
tions in South Ossetia on June 8, 2014. Its leader, Anatoly 
Bibilov, became speaker of parliament. 
In Abkhazia, an extraordinary presidential election 
was held on August 24, 2014 as a result of mass protests 
that May by the opposition, which led to the resignation 
of the head of the de facto republic, Alexandr Ankvab. 
The winner, Raul Hajinba, is leader of the Forum of 
People’s Unity of Abkhazia and supports intensifying mili-
tary and political cooperation with Russia and freezing 
contacts with Georgia almost completely.
For both of these partly recognized republics, the 
signing of bilateral treaties with Russia was a key foreign 
policy event. The Russian-Abkhazian treaty on coopera-
tion and strategic partnership was signed on November 
24, 2014, and the Russian-South Ossetian treaty on 
alliance and integration was signed on March 18, 2015. 
While these documents strengthened Russian military 
and political presence in the two breakaway republics, 
however, they cannot be described as true milestones in 
their relationships with Russia. Rather, they formalized 
configurations that had already come about in August 
2008, when Russia changed its status from peacemaker 
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to that of a patron and guarantor of Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian security.
In addition to their common features, the two trea-
ties also have their differences. In the Abkhazian case, a 
contradiction soon became apparent between the break-
away republic’s intent to build its own nation state and its 
increasing dependence on Russian military and financial 
assistance. The Abkhazian side revised the document to 
preserve some advantages. For example, Russians do not 
have the right to obtain Abkhazian citizenship, and the 
word “integration” was excluded from the document’s 
title. South Ossetians were, in contrast, interested in 
maximum integration with Russia – up to becoming part 
of it (a repetition of the Crimea scenario). The differences 
can be summed up thus: while Abkhazia tries to preserve 
its independence (under Russian military and political 
guarantees), South Ossetia considers its independence to 
be a transitional stage on its path toward unification with 
North Ossetia within the Russian Federation. 
What the two republics currently share is that nei-
ther will consider the option of returning to Georgian 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Georgian topic is no longer on 
either country’s political agenda. More pressing are the 
questions of the quality of independence to be had under 
Russia’s aegis and the price of Russian influence. This 
issue is more topical in Abkhazia as it seeks to maintain 
a certain freedom from the Russian presence (at least, to 
protect itself from the coming of Russian big business). 
In South Ossetia by contrast, there is an interest in more 
direct Russian engagement, especially in the process of 
its economic and infrastructural rehabilitation after the 
2008 war.
Conclusion
Because of its geographic proximity and its long history 
of engagement, Russia still has vital security interests 
in the South Caucasus, and other interests as well. Even 
after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Russia therefore 
did not dissociate itself form the region. If its interests in 
the region have remained largely constant, however, its 
polices and strategies to safeguard them have changed 
with internal developments, with its evolving foreign 
policy perspectives, and with the changing nature of its 
international relations, especially with the West.
Certainly, the steady deterioration of Russian-Western 
relations since the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 has com-
plicated Russia’s choices in the South Caucasus. The Rus-
sian annexation of Crimea in particular has given new life 
to Western fears about the stability of the  Post-Cold-War 
European order.
The risk of more conflict between Russia and the West 
cannot be ruled out. However, Russia’s broader interests 
require that it avoid taking risks in the Caucasus. Instead, 
it should focus on Ukraine, where the future shape of 
European security could be determined. It should also 
focus on establishing its position as an active participant 
in anti-terrorism efforts on an equal footing with West. By 
not moving too fast to integrate the breakaway republics 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has indicated that 
it is unlikely to repeat the actions it undertook in Crimea. 
The Kremlin has no universal approach to the South 
Caucasus in general, nor to its particular conflicts. All 
its approaches are determined by concrete dynamics. If 
it can avoid changing the status quo, it is not interested 
in breaking the “rules of the game.” However, if it sees a 
favorable status quo coming under threat, it can react in a 
tough way, be it by recognizing a de facto state or through 
annexation. At the same time, the Russian leadership has 
neither the intention of restoring the USSR nor ideas of 
pursuing “imperial revenge.” Its political behavior is deter-
mined not by ideological program or even a clear strategy 
but by reactions to security challenges as well as by the 
conflict dynamics.
Russia is trying to prevent the collapse of the available 
negotiation frameworks such as the Geneva consultations 
on the situation in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia 
and the negotiations on the settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. These formats are channels of commu-
nication between the parties to the conflicts and all actors 
engaged in the peace process.
In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, alongside the current 
format of the OSCE MG, Russia is interested in intensifying 
the three-party negotiation process at the presidential level 
(Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), not in opposing the 
existing framework for negotiations. This format already 
proved itself in 2008–12, when it helped hold back Armenia 
and Azerbaijan from repeating the South Ossetian scenario 
and even reach mutual agreements on humanitarian is-
sues. In addition to increasing Russian participation, this 
presidential-level format would help block the efforts of 
other members of the OSCE MG, especially the US.
While promoting Armenia’s integration into the EAEU, it 
is important for Russia to build relations with the country’s 
entire political spectrum to forestall a sharp polarization 
over Armenia’s relations with Russia and over Eurasian 
integration. Constructive relations between Russia and 
the Armenian opposition would prevent the country from 
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moving closer to the US and the EU before parliamentary 
elections in April 2017 and presidential elections in 2018. 
Russia must also differentiate its policies toward 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose respective elites have 
different goals for their republics. Coordinating integra-
tion actions with them should be undertaken with a 
precise understanding that Russia has its own interests to 
pursue and cannot merely fulfill these republics’ wishes. 
The South Ossetians should refrain from calling on Rus-
sia to repeat the Crimean scenario.
Without ignoring the competitive aspects of its rela-
tions with the West, Russia should try to improve them. 
Building a partnership with the US and its allies to 
counter radical jihadism in the Middle East (considering 
its impact on the North Caucasus) could be a first step in 
this direction and could bear positively on the region’s 
security environment. Russo-Western cooperation could 
also restrain various regional players from yielding to 
the temptation to “unfreeze” existing conflicts. Russian-
Western disagreements and competition both in the 
Eurasian sphere – including the South Caucasus – and 
elsewhere have negatively influenced the development 
of countries in the region and made it more difficult to 
resolve existing conflicts. They have also incurred costs 
for the main players.
Cooperation between Russia and the EU in the South 
Caucasus is made problematic by the different approaches 
to Georgian territorial integrity and differences over the 
recognition Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. 
However both sides can provide more effective coordina-
tion within the framework of Geneva talks, especially 
resolving humanitarian issues in the disputed areas. The 
EU and Russia have also room to cooperate in resolving 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, especially under the 
OSCE, which Berlin’s closest partner, Austria, will chair 
in 2017. Anti-terrorism has already been proclaimed a 
potential area of common interest in spite of existing con-
tradictions, but up until now there have been no concrete 
steps to realize those ideas. As the Caucasus becomes ever 
more influenced by dynamics in the Middle East, such 
cooperation requires practical steps.
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